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Compromise is a common feature of  development 
projects, and it can be one of  the most basic mechanisms 
for producing legitimacy. Through this process, a 
community or political unit can accord some measure of  
assent to the actions of  the aid institution. However, aid 
recipients, whether individuals, communities, or countries, 
often cannot equitably negotiate the price of  their consent 
to participate. Typically, they have inflexible economic, 
political, physical, or health needs that greatly restrict their 
ability to bargain. In short, they may not be able to walk 
away from an offer of  aid, even if  they find it disagreeable 
or damaging to their dignity. The ensuing translation of  
the aid institution’s political power into local development 
currency and political influence clearly results in complex 
shifts in power, authority, and dependency.1
Participatory development promises to reverse, or at least 
mitigate, this inequality of  assent by providing participants 
with structures that offer opportunities for exactly the kind 
of  empowered choices that they have customarily lacked 
when compromising.2 Yet participatory approaches by 
definition require more of  people than merely accepting 
material benefits. This increased involvement may not 
enable them to improve their situation, however, if  there 
are not reasonable alternatives available to them, such as 
other ways of  obtaining capital or achieving much needed 
outcomes.3 The choice of  joining a participatory project 
requires specific compromises that may not always be 
welcome.
Participatory projects are often framed as people having 
a greater say in a relationship with an NGO, suggesting 
that participation is better than other alternatives. Yet 
participatory approaches are often resource-intensive, and 
they require that people accept, if  only in certain contexts 
and over specific periods of  time, that imported patterns 
of  interaction will define the way they are expected to 
engage, not only with the aid institution but with each other. 
Indeed, not only are participants usually expected to accept 
novel structures of  authority and consensus process, they 
are often expected to actively donate their time and labor. 
These aspects of  the participatory process may result in less 
autonomy for aid recipients than one might have hoped.
Let me introduce two guiding questions. First, to what extent 
might participatory processes constitute a mechanism to give consenting 
participants some form of  substantive choice? Second, when are 
participatory projects likely to improve opportunities for equitable and 
dignified choices in developing countries? I will not conclusively 
answer these questions, for I believe that there are as 
many answers as there are development projects. I will use 
these questions to frame the discussion of  a number of  
criticisms relevant to participatory development before 
proposing some tentative structures for thinking about how 
participation might be integrated into other approaches 
to provide opportunities for societal change. Following 
the conclusion, I will provide a short case example that 
illustrates some of  these questions.
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i s  ( r e ) b o r n
 Starting in the 1970s, the optimistic outlook of  international 
development projects began to fade. So much had been 
done (or at least spent), so many authors commented, 
yet with so few truly significant changes of  scale to show 
for it. What is more troubling, many of  the changes that 
could be discerned suggested the perverse effects of  large 
volumes of  foreign aid on poverty, culture, and society. The 
strategies, it turned out, may have been counterproductive, 
compounding the problems and dependencies of  many 
developing countries (e.g. Chenery, Ahluvalia, Bell and 
Duloy 1974, Black 1991, and Escobar 1995). Even in 
cases in which development efforts resulted in economic 
growth, this sometimes appeared to create dramatically 
unequal asset redistribution (e.g. Adleman 1978), and at 
times clearly fostered greater unemployment and inequality 
(Little 2003).
On a local scale, the familiar formulas for development 
projects could be criticized for their imported models with 
a strong technical bent, and their often self-conscious 
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agnosticism about questions beyond water pumps and 
sewers (Fisher 1997). Yet, it was clear that the situation 
of  potential recipients, in their shantytowns or squatter 
settlements, arose from causes beyond water and culverts. 
Increasingly, these larger questions came to seem relevant 
to some of  development’s most daunting constituencies 
of  need.
Many drew the lesson that fine-grained approaches with 
mechanisms for feedback from target communities was 
the only reasonable way to address these problems (e.g. 
Chambers 1994a, b), and making development more 
participatory seemed a necessary first step.  Muraleedharan 
(2006) and others have written that the transformative 
moment for the “alternative” development agenda 
happened at a conference held at Cocoyoc, Mexico in 1974. 
At the conference, representatives of  the UNEP, UNDP, 
UNICEF, WHO, FAO4 and other organizations joined to 
write the Cocoyoc Declaration (Cocoyoc Declaration 1975) 
stating that the then dominant development paradigm, 
couched in macroeconomic understandings of  poverty and 
development, was insufficient to address growing poverty 
and that new considerations, such as “self-realization” 
and freedom of  expression, belonged in the development 
agenda.5 Participatory development was not born at 
Cocoyoc, but reborn. A few experiments in participatory 
development had been tried, but abandoned, in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The critique of  traditional development led 
to a reawakening of  interest in such models, and to their 
rechristening with an updated language of  empowerment 
(Platteau 2003).
Participation has since spread rapidly as a development 
discourse and practice, and it is uncontroversially the “new 
orthodoxy” (Henkel and Stirrat 2001) of  development. 
Indeed, even the World Bank, historically a lagging 
indicator of  development trends, has incorporated the 
rhetoric of   participation into its own projects.  In this 
paper I will discuss the forms of  participation that are 
often included as part of  Nongovernmental Organization 
(NGO) and Community Based Organization (CBO) 
projects and initiatives: often these projects are referred 
to as Community Based Development (CBD) or Com- 
munity Driven Development (CDD). Common features 
include empowering aid recipients, fostering community 
awareness, strengthening local communities or building 
new communities, creating social capital, and encouraging 
shared decision-making. I concentrate on “mainstream” 
models of  participatory development and therefore will not 
discuss some of  the most ambitious models of  participatory 
development that lie outside the mainstream.
Participatory processes are not entirely static, and their 
evolution suggests an almost artisanal process: practices 
are tried out and abandoned based on a growing wisdom 
about what kinds of  things work (Abbot 1999). It is likely 
that, as participation continues to be used, the ways of  
encouraging participation, acceptance, and consensus 
will continue to grow, filling the toolbox of  development 
workers.6 
Although the academic and practical definitions of  CDD / 
CBD model of  participation differ, a quote from the 1995 
World Bank Participation Learning Group provides some 
common language:
[participation is]…a process through which 
stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and 
resources which affect them. (World Bank 
Participation Learning Group 1995)
Variants on this language have become nearly ubiquitous 
in the language of  development projects, yet concerns are 
emerging among development practitioners and scholars 
that the hopes for participatory techniques greatly outstrip 
actual success to date. Recently, development scholarship 
has sought to come to terms with an increasingly common 
critique of  participation: it lacks sufficient engagement with the 
actual political processes in the countries and communities where it is 
practiced.  
The criticism might be mitigated if  participatory 
development could be shown to be dramatically more 
effective than alternatives, yet there are surprisingly few 
empirical studies evaluating the success of  participatory 
development projects. Indeed, in these few studies, 
participatory projects seem to be effective at encouraging 
greater community participation than traditional projects, 
and they do seem to help projects “integrate” into 
communities (for review, see: Mansuri and Rao 2003). Yet 
the studies also show that participation can detract from 
the technical quality of  projects, and in some comparative 
analyses, it has been shown to make little difference to 
projects’ overall success. Such studies are specific to local 
projects and contexts and are of  limited generalizability, 
but their findings make the obvious clear: the rhetoric and 
current best practices of  participation have not experienced 
unambiguous successes, even in terms of  effectiveness at 
delivering resources.
Compromises are inherent to the development imperative 
by which agencies seek effective mechanisms to get 
resources to communities, and, if  possible, make sustainable 
positive changes in their ways of  living. For development 
institutions, participation might be best understood as a 
technique to avoid actively disempowering individuals, 
while, in some contexts, promoting the growth of  some 
form beyond the technical, and some opportunities for 
creative co-participation in the development process.  Yet, 
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the many limits to these processes suggest that, if  we have 
high hopes for what participation might accomplish, it will 
be necessary to engage more intensely with culture and 
context.  The real challenge may be to incorporate efforts, 
participatory or otherwise, into broader processes for 
social and political change.
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  S o c i a l  C h a n g e
Some aid organizations clearly prefer to use participatory 
strategies primarily for practical purposes, to gather 
information or elicit community interest and compliance, 
while others apply participatory frameworks with the belief  
that participatory development is essential to democratizing 
decision-making processes (e.g. Bhatnagar and Williams 
1992, Bergdall 1993).  Unfortunately, the rhetoric that 
surrounds participatory approaches often conflates 
these two issues (Cleaver 1999), substituting discussions 
of  efficacy, as measured in quantifiable outcomes, for 
questions of  transformation and politics.
Moreover, the rhetoric of  participation often seems 
tailored to suit different audiences, who receive 
different justifications, which further obscures what role 
organizations see for participation.  Indeed, the receptive 
audience for participatory discourse is surprisingly diverse. 
Not only does participation have strong support from 
liberal democrats, it also has advocates among market 
liberals (e.g. the growth of  “social entrepreneurship” 
programs at US Business Schools),7 multilateral donor 
agencies, and even the occasional authoritarian regime 
(Hirschman, 1984).8  Since these groups often have deeply 
different goals and mandates, the current consensus about 
the virtues of  participatory development is perplexing.
Perhaps part of  the answer is that each group sees in 
participatory development something of  what they expect 
will happen when the poor are integrated into society.9  Even 
authoritarians are aware of  the positive effects of  better 
integration–less crime, better workers–, and participatory 
development may be one way to achieve these outcomes. 
Nevertheless, participatory discourse can be ambiguous 
about some of  the global-level social and political goals 
of  the enterprise.  While models of  participation are often 
highly specific about the processes of  participation at a 
project level, there is much less clarity about the nature and 
tangibility of  the empowerment expected to take place, and 
whether it is to be genuinely political.  Some of  this lack of  
clarity is probably of  uncomplicated origin: competition 
between organizations for institutional legitimacy and 
donor funding may lead some organizations to avoid 
articulating radical agendas in their projects. 
More broadly, participatory development may be 
acceptable precisely because much of  its discourse relies 
on an apparent parallel between participatory development 
and political democracy, and because of  the supposed 
synergy between democratic means and longer-term 
developmental ends.  This raises an important question: 
do participatory processes in development encourage 
the growth of  democratic politics, or are these processes 
themselves supposed to embody a scalable version of  
more inclusive representation?  
C r i t i c i z i n g  P a r t i c i p a t i o n :  R h e t o r i c 
a n d  R e a l i t i e s
Criticisms made of  participatory approaches have 
tended to contrast the failures and qualified successes of  
participatory projects with the high rhetoric favored by 
its most visible proponents (e.g. Kapoor 2002).  Many are 
damning.  Yet, it is important to move beyond the contrast 
between rhetoric and reality to address the question of  
whether specific problems in participation disqualify it, or 
simply require that it be used with greater care and attention 
to its potential weaknesses.  In this section I will introduce 
several criticisms made of  participatory development 
practice including: (i) lack of  politicization, (ii) cueing 
and local coercion, (iii) superficial or artificial community 
identity, and (iv) lack of  transferable social knowledge.  
(i) The new participatory development: antiradicalism?  
The origins of  participatory development are radical, 
as Cleaver points out (Cleaver 1999), linked to the work 
of  Paulo Freire and others who attempted to reorganize 
the process of  development.  Freire and others saw 
development as potentially both transformative and anti-
colonial because of  its potential to break down the teacher-
student / development worker-beneficiary dichotomies. 
Freire’s Pedagogy of  the Oppressed (Freire 2000) and later 
works articulate a vision for an adult literacy education 
in which there is no textbook.  Instead, communities are 
encouraged to choose the words they would like to learn 
as part of  a process intended to give them the language 
and concepts necessary to developing an actionable class-
consciousness.  Participatory approaches borrow much 
from this model, substituting an empowerment discourse 
for traditional Marxist categories: when people are enabled 
and encouraged to choose among options, to select for 
themselves, they are said to experience empowerment.  Similarly, 
this may represent an interesting modification of  Marxist 
notions of  ownership as a means of  achieving control of  
production to include the idea of  “stakeholders” as having 
a mechanism to engage in democratic social control. 
One can appreciate the radical potential of  participatory 
development when one realizes that participation looks a lot 
like decentralized democracy.  Despite a rhetoric imported 
from Freirian notions of  shifting the balance of  power, it 
is unclear whether anyone in the aid community/
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political community really expects or even wants to see 
the loss of  power this would entail in a large institution-
managed project. Participation has been criticized on these 
grounds: it is too institution-driven and too bounded by 
expectations, unstated inequalities, and power dynamics 
(e.g. Mohan and Stokke 2000). Today, institution-driven 
participatory development rarely seems to have a radically 
egalitarian edge, and it is unlikely that World Bank projects 
have ever radicalized communities with their nominally 
participatory community contact. Certain participatory 
strategies, such as Robert Chambers’ Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (Chambers 1994a, b) have been strongly 
criticized for being too focused on practical questions, 
while avoiding difficult questions of  gender, politics, and 
legitimacy (Kapoor 2002). Critics, often citing Freire’s 
ideas, question whether participatory development’s frame 
of  reference is too local and project-defined, making it 
difficult to engage or make sense of  possibilities for wider 
political change (Mohan and Stokke 2000).
Nevertheless, by working at the day-to-day level and 
enabling women to occupy roles of  importance, or peasants 
to participate in basic decisions about how the work is to 
be done, participatory development may be having a very 
direct effect on the social and political consciousness of  
people—more so than a larger, more abstract governance 
structure where they do not have hands-on experience 
running things. Yet, in the context of  hopes for structural 
change, “think globally, act locally” makes sense only if  
there is room for thinking globally (e.g., about governance 
or gender roles) as well as acting locally—but the projects 
rarely offer mechanisms for this second kind of  engaged 
political citizenship.
While a project may elicit participatory input through 
workshops organized around Community Action Planning 
or other strategies, the ticking clock of  donor funding 
and the organizational objectives that the NGO brings 
to the table may deeply constrain the selection of  how 
much participatory feedback is turned into projects. 
These constraints may be inexplicit and may involve the 
subtle cueing by NGOs to focus on certain kinds of  
“uncontroversial” needs like water or sanitation, or to make 
requests that fit the NGOs’ own resources and mandates.  
The process of  participation may involve multiple levels 
of  interaction, with the community well aware of  the aid 
organization’s expectations and favored rhetoric, and aware 
too of  what the community will and will not be able to ask 
for. These expectations predetermine a great deal of  the 
actual content of  participation.  Here are some reports, 
chosen at random from a list of  reports on communities 
organized by an NGO in Phnom Penh, submitted following 
participatory community consultations:
People decided to solve the problem of  sanitation, 
communal toilets as a priority and they hope that 
they can save some money for their children go to 
school, have better health, less skin disease, and 
good sanitation.
People decided to solve the problem of  walkway 
in priority and they hope that they can spend less 
money, good health, and good sanitation, easily 
access in/out community.
People decided to solve the problem of  sanitation, 
garbage management, in priority and they hope 
they can spend less money, good health, and good 
sanitation.
People decided to solve the problem of  a laterite 
road as a priority. They hope that they can then 
save some money for their children to go to 
school; improve their health (less skin disease) and 
sanitation; have easier access out/in community, 
and better clothes. (URC 2003a, b, c)
While not necessarily representative, the stock phrasing, 
summarizing the outputs of  participatory processes, 
describes what people have “decided” after a participatory 
process. However, underlying issues of  poverty are 
apparent: health, inability to afford schooling, inability 
to afford clothing, and physical marginalization of  the 
community, among others. Clearly these issues contribute 
to the structural context of  the problem, yet the outcomes 
of  the participatory process are requests for very specific 
things that the NGO is prepared to offer. 
(ii)  Projects and resources
The project model of  community intervention has a specific 
timescale and, in practice, can provide only a limited set of  
resources to communities. A program may, for example, 
be able to offer specific services such as the improvement 
of  basic infrastructure or certain kinds of  savings and 
credit loan schemes. When such organizations undertake 
participatory workshops to encourage communities to state 
needs, the list is unlikely to yield broader requests like fair 
taxation, government transparency, or equal representation. 
A development planner may well want to ask: to what extent, 
in countries lacking participatory political processes, does providing a 
community with an experience of  participation restricted to the choice 
of, say, water taps vs. toilets, actually advance their social capital?
Part of  the difficulty in answering this question is 
that, without certain formal structures of  legitimacy, 
representation, and voice, it is nearly impossible to 
evaluate just how participatory a process is. It is important 
to recognize the reality that the ongoing legitimacy of  the 
NGO is not really affected by whether the communities in 
A g o r a ’ 0 8 53
which it works accord it some sort of  mandate. Moreover, 
we need to ask what measures NGOs use to ensure that 
they are accountable to important community needs. 
Sometimes limits are alluded to, but just as often they may 
be dismissed. 
It is not clear whether the strong leadership meant that some 
families were “left out” of  discussions and meetings but in 
general it seems that there were opportunities for people to take 
part in meetings and voice concerns.
-Quote from URC report on participatory 
process for community relocation, Phnom Penh 
(URC, 1999).
This quote illustrates the problem: the “participatory” 
interactions that the NGO will have with the community 
are themselves often limited to public meetings and focus 
groups where people take turns speaking (I am unaware 
of  any participatory projects that incorporate the secret 
ballot). The mere fact that people are talking or “voicing” 
concerns, does not guarantee equal civic participation or 
political influence on decisions. This problem is aggravated 
by the fact that there often is great pressure for decisions 
to take the form of  a consensus. 
As Cleaver and Kaare (1998) note in reference to a 
rural Zimbabwean water project, complex local norms 
determined the actual processes of  decision making, yet 
these subtle norms are often not discussed in development 
literature. Furthermore, many of  the features of  
participatory approaches cited as contributing to their 
effectiveness, such as community pressure to participate 
during public forums, are not likely to elicit full and fair 
individual participation. 
(iii) When the “community” speaks, what voice is heard?
Another approach to explaining the value of  participatory 
development in NGO-sponsored projects might be that 
it provides mechanisms through which communities 
can exercise a kind of  power and that, by providing a 
participatory project, communities are given voice and a 
chance to operate as units.  A common criticism of  this 
way of  thinking takes issue with the apparently common 
assumption among NGOs that the community actors they 
are dealing with constitute and represent the “community.” 
This often ignores pervasive power dynamics internal to 
communities, barriers to vocal participation, the multiple 
identities of  community actors, and individuals’ complex 
motivations (e.g. Cleaver 1999 and Parfitt 2004). While this 
community-level empowerment is interesting, community 
itself  has proven to be an elusive concept. 
 
NGOs have sometimes rejected the tactic of  getting 
resources to people via formal government channels on 
principle, citing the corruption or lack of  democracy. 
Similarly, they may reject such dealings on the grounds 
of  efficiency alone: corruption and lack of  democracy 
may introduce greater inefficiencies in transmitting donor 
money to communities. Both are either sound bases to 
attempt to work around or reasons to avoid governments 
in developing countries. Yet even as they have learned 
to be cautious about working through undemocratic or 
corrupt governments, NGOs have often failed to submit their 
community leadership structures to similar scrutiny. It is in 
fact an open question whether the community structures 
that organizations choose to deal with in participatory 
approaches represent more essentially democratic alter-
natives. 
In the course of  developing the Boeung Kak Pilot 
Project, a large-scale participatory mapping and land rights 
program in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, I was invited to a 
dinner hosted by a local community leader. In Cambodia, 
community leaders are nominated by the lowest level of  
elected officials, Village Chiefs, often on the basis of  party 
affiliation and patronage networks linked to the dominant 
Cambodian People’s Party. Her house was the nicest in 
the community and was one of  few raised high enough 
to avoid floods. As it turned out, she was among the 
wealthiest in the community and was a landlord of  many 
other shacks. The position of  such an obvious stakeholder, 
with economic interests that may not align with those of  
other community members, made it unclear whether she 
accurately represented the community’s interests. Thus, 
while the obvious corruption of  government officials may 
make it easy to declare them lacking in democratic mandate 
and un-representative of  their constituency, evoking a 
more participatory approach does not obviate the need to 
be sensitive to the specific power structure and interests 
that motivate “community leaders” and other partners in 
participatory development (Bryant and White 1982).  
Problems  of  informal coercion and lack of  representative-
ness are difficult to assess in the political realm as well. The 
political class is usually a privileged or relatively wealthy 
group. While this does not mean that politicians are de facto 
unanswerable to the needs of  a disadvantaged constituency, 
their relationships with traditionally vulnerable or excluded 
groups and individuals are likely to be less rule-governed 
and transparent than the politician-citizen relationship in an 
institutionalized democratic process. For this reason, even 
apparently open community forums may contain elements 
of  informal coercion that are more difficult to evaluate and 
contend with (Mohan and Stokke 2000), especially if  the 
participatory project is organized by a foreign NGO that 
lacks knowledge of  local power structures.  
The issue may be represented as a question of  political 
identity and influence. The NGO, and perhaps the 
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community as well, may inadvertently have endowed roles 
that do not correspond to community interests or structures. 
In this way community participation may formalize the 
roles of  certain stakeholders without appreciation for their 
multiple identities and motivations. It would be interesting 
to explore such relationships with a view to understanding 
whether they have certain structural similarities to forms 
of  patron-client relationship politics.
More broadly, there is a question about the definition 
of  community. According to Midgley et al (1988), a 
community can be defined in terms of  shared needs, 
situation, or geographic locale. Others have defined 
communities in terms of  collective action and autonomy 
(Edwards and Jones 1980). These definitions are useful 
to aid organizations because they tend to create a single 
community out of  a shared need for some uncontroversial 
improvement, like water or sanitation, despite the apparent 
artificiality and transience of  such approaches. 
More recent approaches10 have tended to avoid one-
dimensional models, suggesting that communities not only 
are strongly stratified but also have shifting historical and 
political identities (e.g. Mosse 1995a, b). As Cleaver and 
Kaare (1998) point out, the “solidarity” model of  unified 
community, common to development projects, may be 
desirable because of  its simplicity, but nonetheless it is 
largely inadequate.  
Cleaver (1999) has explained the problem as reflecting a 
kind of  expediency, a blindness to multiple identities that 
might be convenient for both community members and 
NGOs. Community members, discovering the access 
to power, prestige, and money that come from contact 
with NGOs, may be sophisticated enough to represent 
themselves as having whatever roles the NGOs steer them 
towards. In the meantime, working with these “community 
leaders” allows NGOs to state that they are involving the 
community, and hence are engaging in a “participatory 
process” without the burdens and risks associated with 
full-scale community organizing. Nevertheless, there are 
certainly many examples of  organizations for which this is 
not the case, and in which large-scale community organizing 
and political change have grown through participatory 
projects.  The work of  the Asian Coalition for Housing 
Rights in Bangkok, Thailand, may be one example (e.g. 
Boonyabancha 2005).11
There is, however, a broader question: whether community 
identity itself  is a construct or something with indigenous 
meaning. In the case of  Phnom Penh, Cambodia, for 
example, the term “community” was at least partly 
introduced by NGOs, including member NGOs of  the 
Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (such as the Urban 
Sector Group and the Solidarity for the Urban Poor 
Federation) and UN-Habitat12 in the early 1990s. It may 
be the case that these communities function as identities 
deployed by or coexisting between the NGO and the 
community and, as such, are unorthodox and difficult 
to evaluate sites of  negotiation for resources, voice, and 
identity. Here we find a potentially important possibility: 
that the interest-based communities constituted by the 
NGOs’ projects can become a new political force in their 
own right—a site not only where the NGO provides 
resources, teaching, and empowerment, but where more 
enduring community cohesion and capacity for collective 
action can be built. At present, we know little about this, 
and more research is needed into whether, and when, this 
occurs. 
 
(iv) Participation: taking it with you.
What, then, is the value of  participation in such projects? 
Perhaps the very process of  participation can itself  be 
a source of  value. Through the development process, 
community members might be able to exercise some 
influence, though this structure may be transient and 
constrained by the budget, project, and timeline of  the 
participating organization. Aside from the idea of  the 
value in an empowering arena, Putnam’s popularization of  
the concept of  social capital is often used to describe what 
communities will derive from the development encounter 
(Alkire et al 2001). In this model, networks of  social re-
lations themselves possess a kind of  value in fostering 
productive activity, vesting participating individuals with 
social capital, which they can subsequently deploy by calling 
upon such networks (Putnam 1993, 1995). Consider, for 
example, this description of  a participatory development 
project in Indonesia originally organized around Com-
munity Based Natural Resource management:
…human capital was clearly enhanced.  People’s 
leadership skills increased, their technical knowledge 
and skills were enhanced, communication ability 
improved, negotiation abilities advanced, and 
individual motivations to act on problems were 
triggered.  We noticed also that stakeholders with 
different social status developed the confidence to 
improve relationships with each other.  
Changes in social capital were, however, even more noticeable. 
Trust was established among different stakeholders which, 
in turn, improved relationships and balanced power 
differences. (Kusumanto et al. 2005)
Here, the concept of  social capital is used to assert that 
social competence learning (beyond, for example, technical 
learning) took place.  While something will always be learned 
in an encounter, it may be asked whether this learning 
actually provides knowledge and political awareness that 
translates into social capital in interactions with other 
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social and political institutions. Community members 
might indeed learn the virtues and skills of  political and 
social negotiation in a consensus-based process, but how 
well do these equip them with techniques and strategies 
for the many other interactions that form their political 
and social identities? Such a question is especially pertinent 
when the participatory development project is taking place 
in a highly authoritarian society.
The use of  the concept of  increased social capital, or 
versions of  Amartya Sen’s notion of  augmented capacities 
(Sen 1997) to justify participatory development, has been 
criticized as a deep oversimplification of  power dynamics, 
change, and political knowledge (Mohan and Stokke 2000, 
Mansuri and Rao 2003). Those who advocate strategies 
to increase social capital assume that its acquisition 
will decrease certain relative inequalities (e.g. inequalities 
of  influence on shared activities, though perhaps not 
wealth inequalities as such). Yet providing social capital 
to individuals embedded in preexisting structures of  
power and influence may not decrease relative inequality, 
as different classes and genders, may have quite different 
capacities to leverage gains quite differently (Mansuri and 
Rao [2003], citing sociologist Pierre Bordieu, note that 
the elite have access to more powerful and influential 
social networks in the first place). Arun Agrawal’s recent 
quantitative work demonstrating that level participation 
(i.e. time, voice) in community based projects is positively 
correlated with economic status may also suggest another 
avenue for exploring the issue of  differential learning and 
benefit in CBD contexts (Agrawal and Gupta 2005).
C o n c l u s i o n s :   A  T e n t a t i v e 
F r a m e w o r k  f o r  T h i n k i n g  a b o u t 
Q u a l i f i e d  S u c c e s s e s 
A likely rejoinder to the problems identified above is: 
despite the many problems of  participatory development, 
some of  which can probably be fixed over time, it is 
much better that projects be participatory than not.  Who would 
disagree?
Let me begin to answer with reference to a concept found 
in market economics: the problem of  the second best 
(Lipsey and Lancaster 1957, Blackorby, 1990). In a market 
system that has some uncorrected market externality 
or market imperfection like imperfect information, the 
system may produce an output very different from a 
Pareto-optimal equilibrium (in other words, a situation in 
which doing any more good for one actor would cause 
loss to another).  Even if  we accept the premise that, in 
a perfectly functioning market, a Pareto-optimal outcome 
would be obtained, it does not follow that improving an 
existing imperfect market condition (e.g. by providing 
more information or increasing competition) will produce 
a nearer to optimal outcome. Giving consumers more 
accurate information about nutrition in packaged food, 
for example, may not lead to better consumer choices, 
since they may be scared away from packaged food and 
consume more unlabeled prepared food that is worse for 
them. Incrementalism, therefore, is not guaranteed to yield 
improvement. Thus, a piecemeal solution to a problem in a 
second-best situation cannot be expected to have the same 
effect as it would under perfect market conditions. A key 
implication of  second-best problems is that no universal 
rule for solving them exists, because there is no guarantee 
of  how an imperfect market will behave. 
The second-best problem indicates that piecemeal 
approaches to improvement, say, in markets or welfare, may 
not result in improvements in system-level equilibrium. 
Do piecemeal changes in potential political influence and 
choice, such as inclusion in a participatory project, in the 
absence of  wide-scale participatory political processes, 
guarantee that the net effect will be an improvement in 
individual or community equity? The answer is probably 
mixed. The concerns articulated in this paper suggest that 
there is reason to believe that a little bit of  participation 
will not result in more equitable dynamics of  power or 
resource distribution, even between individuals in a face-
to-face encounter. Equity gains and losses for individuals 
may be diverse, reflecting inherent community dynamics, 
as well as dynamics of  the interaction between NGO, 
government, and community. The situation of  the urban 
poor is clearly multiply determined, so that a “start 
somewhere” participatory intervention may fail to produce 
net benefit.13 What if  it creates continued dependencies 
between the NGO and the community for legitimacy 
(e.g. Desai 1999), or if  it results in increasingly conflicted 
relationships, such as the polarization of  relations between 
the community and the state (e.g. Sanya and Mukjija 2001)? 
Moreover, what if  it strengthens the situation of  informal 
community leaders at the expense of  ordinary community 
members? Or exposes individuals to greater political risk? 
These questions suggest interesting possibilities for future 
research.
What if  development projects took as their goal not just 
addressing the causes of  poverty, but also the causes of  the 
poor? That is, what if  development projects took on board 
the idea of  helping to create novel social and political 
structures for those ordinarily marginalized in society 
and politics? In such a setting, some of  the limitations 
imposed upon participatory development by extant power 
structures could be addressed directly. One key limitation 
to participation mentioned here and elsewhere is the 
difficulty of  quantifying its effectiveness on equality and 
transformation. Yet this criticism may contain the kernel 
of  an answer: in the context of  extant power structures, 
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participation alone is unlikely to provide an alternate power 
structure in which societal problems are resolved.  Yet if  
participation is complemented or paired with novel social and political 
structures, such as coalitions, social movements, or political 
parties, the significance of  an education in social and political 
competency becomes clearer. One example is the case of  
Community Based Federations that operate on principles 
of  grassroots decision-making and strategizing, often 
with the assistance of  Community Based Organizations 
(Satterthwate 2001, 2006), and another might be the work 
of  the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights in Thailand.
Such thinking is not always likely to be attractive to NGOs 
and other international development agencies. Not only 
could supporting such coalition-building seem like political 
interference, but causes of  the poor are not the same thing as 
the cause of  alleviating poverty. NGOs will need to evaluate 
what their real priorities are.
The inequality of  assent in the original compromise 
of  some participatory development projects will likely 
be mitigated by what undoubtedly ensues: negotiated 
manipulation of  the participatory process, partly on 
individuals’ terms, and definitely to their own ends. Does 
the way projects inadvertently make resources susceptible 
to extra-procedural manipulation, especially by the non-elite, 
constitute part of  their value? What if  participatory 
projects aren’t just proto-democratic learning experiences, 
or empowerment as defined in development discourse, but 
opportunities for resource-taking and strategizing by non-
elites that go beyond inequality of  the original compromise. 
Participatory projects might offer rare opportunities for 
disadvantaged individuals to strategize within a proto-
civic sphere. Participatory approaches often attempt 
to ensure participation by disadvantaged actors, and it 
would be intriguing to explore whether this creates new 
opportunities for disadvantaged actors to benefit, more on 
their own terms than through credulous adherence to the 
discourse of  empowerment.
Participatory approaches may (sometimes inadvertently) 
create the conditions for disadvantaged actors to advance 
their interests in ways unanticipated by the aid institutions, 
through their strategic manipulation of  the very process 
of  participation. The NGOs might get more participation, 
empowerment, and ultimately development than they 
bargained for, but on the community’s own terms rather 
than in terms of  expectations of  imported models. Thus, 
perhaps the original question of  participation should be 
re-framed: not, will this process enable communities to live 
up to our expectations, but will this process give communities 
access to resources so that they can set their own agendas for meeting 
their needs?
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E n d n o t e s
1  I thank Janan Delgado, American University in Cairo, personal 
communication, for suggesting the concept of  political power 
vs. political influence as a way to conceive of  the power relations 
between NGOs and communities in developing countries.  
2  It is unfortunate that participatory development projects often 
highlight the value of  community mechanisms (i.e. social pressure 
and coercion) as a technique for eliciting high participation rates 
without enquiring whether this has the effect making it more 
difficult for individuals to resist agreements that are disagreeable 
to them.
3  This may be especially likely in societies in which government 
is weak or has reached agreement with NGOs / CBOs that they 
will exclusively provide certain services.  
4  United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations 
Development Programme, United Nations Children’s Fund, 
World Health Organization, United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization. 
5  Renewed interest in participation also paralleled a new emphasis 
on decentralization of  services and governance on the part of  
theorists and international aid agencies (for reviews and discussion, 
see: Bardhan 2002 and Muraleedharan 2006).  For an example 
of  a decentralizing project, see Miranda and Hordijk’s (1998) 
discussion of  Agenda 21 in Peru.
6  Participatory Learning and Action Notes, a journal, is an example 
of  this sharing and refining of  participatory techniques: http://
www.iied.org/NR/agbioliv/pla_notes/current.html
7  Some of  an ever-growing list of  Social Entrepreneurship 
programs at US and international Business Schools: Harvard, 
Duke, Michigan, Stanford, New York University, Columbia 
among others.
8  Albert Hirschman (1984, pp. 98-99) notes the case of  Brazil 
in which Communidades Ecclesiasticas de Base, a Catholic grassroots, 
grew in the context of  Brazil’s strong authoritarian regime.  A 
more recent example may be the growth of  the Baan Mankong 
program lead by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights 
in Thailand, which received strong support from the Thai 
Government under Former Prime Minister Thaksin.  
9  Thus, supporters of  decentralization might expect the 
emergence of  market societies, while liberal democrats would 
project a greater chorus of  voices supporting specifically poor 
issues.  Even in ‘democratic’ and developed countries, there is a 
remarkable agreement, and a shared and often heroic discourse 
about the process even as the vision of  the expected structural 
outcomes for society may be highly disputed.  
10  Recently, others have tackled the question of  community 
from the framework of  Community Based Natural Resources 
Management, Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson provide a 
useful introduction to current thinking about the problems of  
community definition (Agrawal and Gibson 2001).
11  The Baan Mankong program in Bangkok, Thailandis a 
large scale community-managed infrastructure subsidy program 
directed through the Community Organizations Development 
Institute (CODI).  For discussion, see: Boonyabancha (2005).
12  Jack Jin Gary Lee, formerly of  the University of  Chicago, 
Personal Communication discussing ongoing unpublished 
research.
13  If  individuals participate in consensus decision-making, the 
best choice may be unavailable; instead, communities may be 
pressured to agree to a second-best option.  Yet in certain cases, 
such as housing rights, the best available choice (vs. possible) 
might result in outcomes that actually create system-level losses 
in power.   A hypothetical example might be useful: a squatter 
community vulnerable to eviction accepts the help of  an NGO 
concerned with housing reform. The community’s first choice 
would be to receive land tenure from the government, but that is 
not offered.  Instead, given the sorts of  resources the NGO can 
make available, the community is led to accept a seeming second-
best: upgrading infrastructure, with the possible effect of  making 
residents harder to evict.  But upgrading may have little deterrent 
effect on the government, and the extensive community time and 
labor it involves will be entirely lost if  the community is evicted. 
In such a setting, members of  the community might better have 
spent the time and labor consumed by the participatory project 
trying to improve their economic situation, so that they would be 
better positioned to cope with eviction.  Examples of  this problem 
may be found in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  In one case a large 
community infrastructure improvement project (the “Monivong 
A B” Community) sponsored by the UNDP in central Phnom 
Penh was completely destroyed during a forced eviction in 2006, 
despite being cited for several years as a model for securing tenure 
through participatory infrastructure development. 
